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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ) 
v. ) 
JAMES PATRICK IVIE, ] 
Defendant. ] 
I APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
I Case No. 970656-CA 
I Priority Two 
> (Defendant Not Incarcerated) 
ARGUMENT 
This reply brief will follow the order of arguments in the Brief of Appellee. 
Critical parts of the record are in the Addendum to Appellant's opening brief. 
POINT I 
RECEIPT OF THE DUI REPORT AS AN EXHIBIT WAS 
NOT JUSTIFIED AS REHABILITATION EVIDENCE AND 
WAS HARMFUL ERROR. 
This court should find that Ivie made adequate trial court objections to 
present the Rule 801(d)(1)(B) pre-motive requirement discussed in Point I of 
Ivie's opening brief. If such a determination is not made by this court, the 
doctrine of plain error should be invoked to hold that it was harmful error to admit 
the DUI Report as an exhibit under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 
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The DUI Report can not be justified as an exhibit showing a prior 
consistent statement. The rehabilitation argument in Point IB of the state's brief 
is without merit. Admission of the report as an exhibit improperly bolstered the 
state's case, was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403 and harmful error. 
Application of the multiple admissibility argument in Point I D of the 
state's brief is not appropriate in this case. The report should have been excluded 
as an exhibit under Rule 803(5). 
A. Adequate objections were made to present the pre-motive 
requirement of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) on appeal. If this court 
finds Ivie's objections were insufficient on this point, the 
doctrine of plain error should be applied to reach the pre-
motive issue. 
The state contends that Ivie waived his argument that the DUI report did 
not meet the pre-motive criteria for admission under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). 
Although Ivie's trial court objections were not in the precise terms of the 
pre-motive discussion in Point I of Ivie's Opening Brief, there was adequate 
objection to let the court know that it was making an error. Ivie's counsel advised 
the trial judge that Rule 801 does not provide a basis for introduction of statements 
in written document form when the statements have already been testified to 
exactly from the document (R. 539, 537); the report was not pertinent (R. 536); the 
admission of the report as exhibit was prejudicial (R. 542); and there was an 
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improper foundation (R. 536). The fact that the exhibit was nothing more than a 
written statement of the exact testimony previously given by officer Marx was 
pointed out by Ivie's counsel on numerous occasions (R. 542, 539, 537-536). 
Ivie's trial arguments and the fact Rule 801(d)(1)(B) speaks of prior 
statements that are consistent with the declarant's testimony should have made it 
clear to the trial court that it was error to construe the rule as allowing the receipt 
of the exact same document that had been previously read in oral testimony. 
Following the guidance in State v. Seale, 853 P.2d 862, 874 (Utah, 1993), 
this court should find that Ivie did not waive his argument that the report failed the 
pre-motive criteria for admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). In Seale, testimony 
by the mother of J. W. and P. W. contradicted the testimony by J. W. concerning 
the number of sexual molestation incidents reported to the mother. The mother's 
sister was then called and asked about statements the victim had made to her. 
The defense objected on the bases of a generic hearsay objection. The trial court 
ruled the testimony admissible as prior consistent statements since the victims' 
credibility had been questioned. On appeal, the court stated: 
Before reaching the merits of this claim [inadmissibility of 
statements under 801(d)(1)(B)], we consider the State's assertion 
that Seale waived his rule 801(d)(1)(B) claim because his 
objection was not sufficiently specific under rule 103(a)(1) of the 
Utah Rules of Evidence. (Citations omitted.) Although Seale's 
objection was vague, the judge clearly understood it when he 
ruled that the statement was admissible as a prior consistent 
statement. Rule 103(a)(1) allows trial counsel to forego 
explaining his or her grounds for objection if the specific ground 
is "apparent from the context," which it obviously must have 
been. 
3 
853 P.2d, at 874. 
The court in Seale went on to find that the statements were of only minor 
significance compared to the substantial evidence of guilt. This is distinct form 
the instant case where the DUI Report was admitted as a written exhibit that 
contained a concise presentation of the state's side of practically all contested facts 
and the prosecutor repeatedly referenced the exhibit in closing argument with 
requests that it be reviewed during deliberations. More importantly, the generic 
objection made in Seale did substantially less than Ivie's arguments in the instant 
case to put the trial judge on notice that admission of the report was error. 
The state cites several cases as support for the contention on page 15 of the 
state's brief that: "This court has consistently held that a claim of error is not 
preserved on appeal unless the appellant raised a timely and specific objection 
before the trial court." These authorities are distinguished below and do not 
support the application of such a proposition in the instant case. 
The circumstances in State v. Winward, 941 P.2d 627 (Utah App. 1997), 
were tantamount to making no objection at all and involved a possible tactical 
decision to not object. The argument on appeal in Winward related to remarks on 
cross-examination and closing arguments as to the defendant exercising his rights 
to remain silent and to have an attorney. The comment during cross-examination 
was withdrawn after the defendant's objection and no request was made for a 
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curative instruction or mistrial. No objection at all was made to the comment 
during closing argument. 941 P.2dat 633. 
In State v. Beltran -Felix, 922 P.2nd 30 (Utah App. 1996), the appellant's 
brief lacked any separate argument or analysis for the constitutional arguments 
raised for the first time on appeal. 922 P.2d at 33. 
The vagueness argument in State v. Pugmire, 898 P.2d 271 (Utah App. 
1995), was made for the first time on appeal without any constitutional challenge 
having been made in the trial court and no demonstration or argument as to plain 
error or exceptional circumstances. 898 P.2d at 272-273. 
In State v Brown, 856 P.2d 358 (Utah App. 1993), the defendant made a 
trial level due process and equal protection challenge to the statute under which he 
was being tried. On appeal, he attacked the statute on the totally different 
constitutional argument of First Amendment overbreadth and also argued that the 
police had engaged in selective enforcement and outrageous conduct. None of 
these asserted defenses had been raised at trial. 
Broberg v.Hess, 782 P.2d 198 (Utah App. 1989), involved a claim that the 
trial court should have asked certain proposed voir dire questions to the jury. The 
record did not reflect that the questions had ever been brought to the trial judge's 
attention at the time of voir dire; there was no objection to the court's failure to 
ask them; and the appellant had passed the jury for cause. 782 P.2d at 201. 
In the last case cited by the state as to specificity of objections, this court in 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah App. 1996), refused to 
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examine a claim raised for the first time on appeal that third party attorney fees 
had not been properly considered in terms of a privity of interest. There had been 
no objection to the jury instructions on privity grounds; and the privity issue had 
not been argued in any motions or submitted in proposed jury instructions. 
Ivie's objections to the receipt of the DUI Report as an exhibit went 
beyond what was deemed adequate in Seale and far exceeded anything in the cases 
cited by the state. Ivie's trial arguments that the report was not pertinent and 
merely reiterated previous testimony clearly went to rehabilitation relevancy, 
which is the touchstone of the pre-motive requirement. If this court finds the 
objections below were not adequate to preserve the more complete pre-motive 
argument made in Point I of Ivie's opening brief, the court should grant a new trial 
on this point by applying the doctrine of plain error. 
Rules 103(a)(1) and (d) of the Utah Rules of Evidence provide: 
Rule 103. Rulings on evidence. 
(a) Effect of erroneous ruling. Error may not be predicated 
upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a 
substantial right of the party is affected, and 
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a 
timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the 
specific ground of the objection, if the specific ground was not 
apparent from the context; 
(d) Plain error. Nothing in this rule precludes the taking 
notice of plain errors affecting substantial rights although they 
were not brought to the attention of the court. 
The prerequisites and standard of review for obtaining relief under the plain 
error doctrine are set forth as follows in State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993): 
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In general, to establish the existence of plain error and 
to obtain appellate relief from an alleged error that was not 
properly objected to, the appellant must show the following: (i) 
An error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant, or phrased differently, our confidence in the verdict is 
undermined. 
850 P2d at 1208-9 (citations omitted). In State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, at 343 
(Utah 1997), review was denied because the appellant had strategically chosen not 
to object at trial, but the court noted that: "Generally we review objections raised 
for the first time on appeal for plain error." (Citations omitted.) 
B. The DUI Report should not have been admitted as an 
exhibit under any theory of rehabilitation evidence. 
The state acknowledges that if rule 801(d)(1)(B) has a temporal pre-motive 
requirement, the DUI report would be inadmissible under that rule. (Brief of 
Appellee p. 17). The state does not, however, directly address the question of 
why this court should not follow the Utah precedent oiSilva v. Pickard, 10 Utah 
78, 37 P. 86 (1894), and State v. Carrington, 15 Utah 480, 50 P. 526 (1897), which 
apply the pre-motive temporal requirement and are cited on pages 15 and 16 of 
Ivie's opening brief. Instead, it is contented on page 19 of the state's brief that 
"No Utah court has directly addressed whether the Utah rule, which is identical to 
the federal rule, imposes the same [pre-motive] requirement" and that "This court 
need not decide whether Utah's rule 801(d)(1)(B) imposes a pre-motive 
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requirement... because even if the report did not meet the criteria of rule 
801(d)(1)(B), at least the interview portion of the report was otherwise admissible 
for purposes of rehabilitating Marx's testimony." These assertions are 
unsupportable on at least four different counts. 
1.) The state creates an erroneous factual basis to justify the use of the 
report as rehabilitation evidence. Pages 23 and 24 of the state's brief sets forth 
the premise that Ivie attempted to show or that the jury might consider that the 
DUI report was not completely accurate. In point of fact, Marx's testimony and 
the written report upon which it was based was never questioned as to not 
precisely recounting his version of the events. Neither Ivie's challenge of 
improper motive nor anything else in this case raises even the slightest question 
that Marx had made any sort of clerical error, oversight, mistake, inaccuracy or 
unlikely response in recording or reciting his claimed account of the interview. 
The contention is made on page 24 of the state's brief that "...viewing the 
written report itself was the best way for the jury to determining (sic.) whether 
Marx had made up the responses or inaccurately written them down." This 
conjecture lacks any support in the record and begs for a revamping our legal 
system to provide a mode of trial where receiving witnesses' written statements is 
given preference over oral testimony. Assuming, arguendo, the impeachment of 
Marx justified some additional exploration of the DUI Report, there is nothing in 
this case that warranted receiving the report as an exhibit either under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B) or any common law rule. Subject to the limits in Rule 403, 
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rehabilitation could be accomplished through cross-examination of Ivie; and in the 
state's case in rebuttal by asking Marx's recollection about interview questions 
and answers; re-asking Marx about his careful recording the interview; or having 
him re-read parts or all of the interview. All of these rehabilitation approaches 
were in fact utilized by the state (R.. 566-563; 529- 524). 
2.) The written form of the report is not at all a prior statement in terms of 
either Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or any common law rule relating to rehabilitation of an 
impeached witness. The report came into play at the request of the state's trial 
counsel so that Marx could accurately present the details of what he claimed was 
said during his interview with Ivie (R. 414). Marx accurately read the report as 
his in-court testimony. The statements in the report were identical to his in-court 
testimony, but not "consistent" in the sense contemplated by the rule (i.e. two or 
more mutually confirming statements). It is pointed out in U. S. v. Pierre, 781 
F.2d 329 (2nd Cir. 1986), cited on pages 2, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the state's brief, 
that" the issue ought to be whether the particular consistent statement sought to be 
used has some rebutting force beyond the mere fact that the witness has repeated 
on a prior occasion a statement consistent with his trial testimony." (781 F.2d at 
331.) The applicability of this test to the rule prayed for by the state is 
acknowledged at the bottom of page 20 of the state's brief, but the state fails to 
recognize that such a criteria is obviously not met by submitting the same 
statement in verbal and written forms. 
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None of the cases cited in Point I B of the state's brief support the 
bludgeoning of the jury with different forms of the same evidence as an 
appropriate mode of rehabilitation. The following review of the cases offered by 
the state shows how the impeachment rehabilitation rule relied on by the state is 
not applicable to the instant case. 
U. S. v. Juarez, 549 F.2d 1113 (7th Cir. 1977) is a case where the facts 
contained in law enforcement reports had initially been raised by defense counsel 
on cross-examination as to the accuracy of the officer's in-court testimony. 
During defense counsel's detailed questioning about the reports, one of the 
officers testified that the reports were a "generalization" and admitted they might 
be "inaccurate." Fabrication did not appear to be an issue. In holding the 
reports were admissible for the limited purpose of considering the credibility of 
the officers, and not for the truth of the matters asserted therein, the court noted: 
The credibility of... [the officers] was challenged on cross-
examination in an attempt to make it appear that their testimony 
differed from the reports .... The witnesses' answers concerning 
the reports were necessarily fragmentary and might well have 
misled the jury as to the witnesses' credibility in the absence of an 
opportunity to see the reports themselves.... The admission of 
the reports was not error, although we do not mean to encourage 
the admission of reports such as these, and district judges should 
exercise their discretion to admit them only when necessary in 
their judgment to remove confusion, false impressions, or other 
barriers to the ascertainment of truth. 
549 F.2d at 1114. Key points of distinction in Juarez are that the reports had 
been used as a tool by the defense counsel to create a credibility issue; there were 
multiple reports with sufficient material to create a fragmentary setting of 
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confusion and preclude the type of line-by-line repetitive coverage provided in the 
instant case; and the reports were admitted for the limited issue of credibility with 
a corresponding cautionary instruction. 
Juarez does not cite any case authority or state if an objection of any type 
had been raised at trial. The case is also distinguished by the fact that in 
determining the reports were admissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 402 as 
relevant to clearing up confusion relating to credibility, the Juarez court first 
determined there was no rule of exclusion that made the reports inadmissible, and 
then applied a balancing test under rule 403. Not only was there no confusion 
about the content of the report in the instant case, the DUI Report should have 
been specifically excluded by operation of Rule 803(5), which did not apply in 
Juarez, and it was an abuse of discretion not exclude the report under Rule 403. 
The state also cites U.S. v. Harris, 761 F.2d 394 (7th Cir. 1985). In that 
case the defense had shown through examination of a government agent that the 
in-court testimony of a government witness was contradicted by the witnesses' 
statements made during an investigation interview. Other statements from the 
same witness interview that were consistent with the witness's testimony were 
held admissible for the purpose rehabilitation. In the language of the opinion: 
[The agent's] testimony was offered merely to show that... [the 
witness] had not made only inconsistent statements prior to his 
testimony at trial, and therefore those statements were not 
excludable as hearsay and were not subject to the requirements 
ofRule801d)(l)(B). 
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761 F.2d at 399. No such scenario occurred in the instant case, but the following 
language from Harris is applicable: 
...[EJvidence which merely shows that the declarant said the 
same thing at trial as he did on a prior occasion is of no 
probative value to rebut an allegation of recent fabrication 
when the declarant's motive in making both statements was the 
same 'for the simple reason that mere repetition does not 
imply veracity." 
761 F.2d at 399 (citations omitted; emphasis added). 
The state cites U.S. v. Obayagbona, 627 F.Supp. 329 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) for 
the use of a tape recorded prior consistent statement to rehabilitate an officer's in-
court testimony. The impeached testimony in that case involved an agent's 
details of a heroin purchase that had been negotiated with two women at a 
restaurant. The agent's trial testimony had been attacked with the contention that 
the heroin sample had been given to him by the woman who was with the 
defendant. At the time of the arrests made outside the restaurant, the agent's 
fellow officers had asked him about the heroin and the agent's concealed tape 
recorder had picked up his reply that: "The girl in the black and white [dress] 
handed it to me out of her purse." Trial testimony had already shown that the 
defendant had worn a black and white dress and the recorded statement was 
played for the jury to rehabilitate the agent in-court testimony. 
The court in Obayagbona recognized that to be admissible under Rule 
801(d)(1)(B), the recorded statement "must have been made 'prior to the time' that 
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the motive to fabricate arose." (627 F.Supp. at 337.) In holding that that this 
requirement had been met, the court noted that: 
Only at the trial when it became clear that both women would 
testify that defendant never had any drugs in her possession and 
knew nothing about the deal was there a clear and urgent motive 
to falsify. Only at the time the government was putting on its 
case did it become apparent that the two women would call 
Turner a liar with respect to the sample. Up to that point there 
was no overriding motive to prepare a buttressing extrajudicial 
statement. 
(627 F.Supp. at 338). Unlike the DUI Report that had simply been repeated by 
Marx's testimony, the tape in Obayagbona rehabilitated the agent's in-court 
testimony by supplying a distinctly prior statement. Furthermore, there is 
nothing in Obayagbona that indicates the tape was supplied to the jury for use 
during their deliberations. 
In addition to the above distinctions, it is important to note that although 
discusses the admissibility of prior consistent statements used only for 
rehabilitation of impeached credibility, the opinion of the judge in that case 
specifically recognized at that: 
In retrospect, the admission of Agent Turner's taped statement 
appears not to have had any prejudicial impact. The verdicts of 
not guilty on the possession charge and the distribution charge 
suggest that the jury viewed Turner's testimony with appropriate 
caution.... [T]he jury found her guilty only of conspiracy. This 
highly discriminating jury did not use the statement in any way 
detrimental to the defendant. 
(627 F.Supp. at 341). Any error in Obayagbona would seem harmless. 
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Homes v. State, 350 Md. 412, 712 A.2d 554 (1998), was decided on an 
apparently unique Maryland rule with no federal counterpart. (See 712 A.2d at 
560, footnote 2.) Distinguishing facts are seen in the following passage: 
[T]he trial court admitted Thompson's consistent statement into 
evidence because during cross-examination the court had 
previously admitted Thompson's inconsistent statement to the 
police. Thompson's prior consistent statement thus was not 
offered to rebut a motive to fabricate; it was offered to rebut 
Thompson's prior inconsistent statement. 
(712 A.2d at 560. Emphasis added.) Holmes, actually lends support to 
finding error in the instant case by noting: 
As a general rule, prior out-of-court statements made by a 
witness that are consistent with the witness's trial testimony are 
not admissible to bolster the credibility of a witness. The general 
rule has an exception where a witness's credibility is attacked by 
an implication of fabrication ...; then the witness's prior 
consistent statements are admissible if made before the alleged 
fabrication.... 
At common law, a prior consistent statement was admissible only 
to rehabilitate the witness's credibility and not as substantive 
evidence. 
556 A.2d at 556. 
The remaining cases cited in the state's Point I impeachment rehabilitation 
argument each have important distinctions, some of which are noted in the state's 
parenthetical synopsis (e.g. impeachment based on inconsistent prior statements). 
3.) The instant case does lend itself to the state's argument that Utah law 
does not have a pre-motive requirement if a prior consistent statement is offered 
only to rehabilitate impeached testimony. Ivie's charge of improper motive and 
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fabrication is the only tenable basis for showing the impeachment of Marx's 
testimony. The admission of post-motive statements to corroborate impeached 
testimony was the basis for granting a new trial in Silva v. Pickard, 37 P. 86, 10 
Utah 78 (1894). The cases of State v. Sibert, 6 Utah 2d 198, 310 P.2d 388 
(1957), and State v. Asay, 631 P.2d 861 (Utah 1981), cited on page 20 of the 
state's brief do not involve the use of pre-motive testimony and are therefore not 
inconsistent with Silva v. Pickard on that point. 
In Asay, a police detective who had investigated an auto theft testified that the 
defendant had admitted at the scene of the arrest that the vehicle was stolen. The 
defense subsequently called a private investigator who testified the detective had 
recently told him the defendant had made no statements at the time of his arrest. 
The state then produced a police report that had been prepared immediately after 
the arrest and contained a statement by the detective consistent with his in-court 
testimony. There was no pre-motive issue or holding in Asay since the 
rehabilitation statement was made prior to the statement to the private investigator. 
The opinion does not indicate the report had been received as an exhibit. 
State v. Sibert is distinguished by the fact that it involved rehabilitation 
statements made immediately after the crime that were used to corroborate trial 
testimony that had been impeached with inconsistent testimony given at 
preliminary hearing. 310 P.2d at 390, 6 Utah 2d at 201. Furthermore, footnote 
10 in Sibert (310 P.2d at 392, 6 Utah 2d at 204) cites Silva v. Packard (sic.) as 
being based on the proposition that rehabilitating statements are properly denied 
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admission if they were made in self-serving circumstances. Sibert therefore 
recognized Silva in a context that bears directly on the instant case. As noted in 
State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181, 1184 (Utah 1983), police reports ".. .are generally 
made for the purpose of successfully prosecuting a crime...." 
It should also be noted that a new trial was granted in Sibert due to the 
prejudicial impact of allowing hearsay testimony and receiving exhibits of 
corresponding notes that were not strictly relevant for impeachment and were used 
as a conduit to get the states evidence in front of the jury. 
4.) The state clearly sought and used the DUI Report as substantive 
evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) that when beyond the simple rehabilitation 
purpose of showing a consistent statement. The state's trial counsel argued that 
he wanted the exhibit to include the last page because i t" ... shows the motor was 
running, which is a critical part of the case..." (R. 538). Now that Ivie has been 
convicted with the use of the report, the state argues that "it cannot be said that the 
report's admission made any difference on the outcome of this trial." (Brief of 
Appellee, p. 26 ). 
As developed in pages 30-32 in Point IV of Ivie's opening brief, the 
testimony of Purdy and Isaccson was relatively weak. The fact that the report 
was not even pertinent as a prior consistent statement makes its introduction as an 
improper bolstering media for all off the state's witnesses at the arrest scene all the 
more obvious. The report was a critical item of substantive evidence both as to 
the interview section and Marx's comments. After its admission as an exhibit 
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the report was used to support the state's claims that Ivie had operated the vehicle 
and had been "pulled over" (R. 526-24); that Ivie never told Marx that he was not 
driving (R. 524, 508-7); and that the vehicle moved (R. 514-13). Upon 
completing a second detailed coverage of the report with Marx, the state's trial 
counsel went to immediately place the report in the hands of the jury (R. 524). It 
was referred to extensively as substantive evidence in closing argument to show 
the vehicle moved (R. 500); Ivie had driven from the gas pumps (R. 499); the 
interview shows Ivie appears to testify he drove from the pumps (R. 493); and 
Ivie's own opinion as given in the interview was that he was driving and had 
driven from the pumps (R. 491). The state also urged the jury to look closely at 
the exhibit during their deliberations (R. 491); and argued it would be important to 
consider, according to the report, what Ivie said and what Rogers did not say (R. 
477-6). 
It is argued in footnote 8 on page 17 of the state's brief that the interview 
testimony was admissible under Rule 801(d)(2)(A) as an admission of a party 
opponent. The trial judge clearly indicated he considered the interview to be the 
statement of Marx, not Ivie, thereby cutting off the need for any evidence, 
objection or argument as to admissibility as an admission or confession (R. 542). 
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C. The cases cited by the state do not support the contention 
that receiving the DUI Report as an exhibit was harmless 
error. 
The cases cited in Point IC of the state's brief are not factually comparable 
to the admission of DUI Report as an exhibit in the instant case. 
State v Carter, 888 P.2d 629 (Utah 1995), cert denied, 116 S.Ct. 163, 133 
L.Ed.2d 105 (1995), is cited on pages 25-26 of the state's brief for the proposition 
that it is "harmless error to admit [a] transcript abstract as exhibit in part because 
most of the transcript had already been read to the jury." Carter dealt with a 
second penalty hearing after a vacated death sentence. To get the evidence in 
front of the new jury, the state prepared an abstract that "contained all the 
testimony introduced by either party at the original guilt and sentencing 
proceedings." (888 P.2d at 636.) Excerpts were read at the hearing and the 
abstract was admitted as an exhibit to be used by the jury. (888 P.2d at 636-7). 
In finding it was error for the abstract to have been admitted as an exhibit and 
taken into the jury room by the sentencing jury, the decision in Carter stated: 
In State v. Solomon, 96 Utah 500, 87 P.2d 807, 811 (1939), 
we held that "such testimony [given at a former hearing and used 
for impeachment], even though taken by a reporter, transcribed, 
and certified, is not documentary evidence to be received in 
writing and given to the jury." The court further observed that 
"the common law always excluded depositions and written 
testimony from being carried away from the bar by the jury," Id. 
87 P.2d at 811. The Solomon court's rational is sound: If some 
evidence is admitted in oral form only, while other evidence is 
first read and then delivered to the jury in writing, "it is obvious 
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that the side sustained by written evidence is given an undue 
advantage" Id. 
888 P.2d at 642-643 (bracketed language in Carter, emphasis added). In 
reasoning that the error was not harmful in the particular circumstances of Carter, 
the court noted two important distinctions not present in the instant matter: 
[W]e note that taking the Abstract into the jury room 
provided the jurors with their only opportunity to read and 
consider those portions not previously read into the record by the 
state.... Thus, although the court erred, its ruling provided the 
jury with complete access to Carter's original counsel's full 
cross-examination and any other evidence in mitigation contained 
in the Abstract. 
888 P.2d at 644 (emphasis added). Unlike the abstract in Carter, the DUI 
Report had been covered in every detail at least twice with testimony (R. 416-12; 
529-24). Secondly, the DUI Report did not contain Ivie's side of the case. 
State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d. 445 (Utah 1989), is distinguished by the fact it 
did not involve the admission of a written exhibit that was provided to the jury 
with multiple requests that it be read during deliberations. If the notes of the 
testifying officer in Thomas had been received as an exhibit and used in the 
manner of the instant case, Ivie submits the Thomas court would have found the 
error prejudicial. 
The state concedes that Marx's comments on the back page of the report 
were not admissible for rehabilitation (Brief of Appellee, pages 12 and 25), but 
dismisses their importance by reasoning that the jury had already heard the 
testimony of Marx, Purdy and Isaccson as to the claim the vehicle was running 
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and began to move. (Brief of Appellee, p. 26). This downplay of the exhibit 
overlooks the facts presented in pages 30-32 of Ivie's opening brief showing 
Purdy and Isaccson were weak on details, except for facts presented in Marx's 
report; Isaccson made no report, but reviewed the report of Marx; and Purdy's 
report was written months later, after discussions with Marx. The importance of 
the back page of the report is emphasized by the state's use of the exhibit to close 
the final lines of testimony in the state's case in rebuttal (R. 514-513). 
As shown more fully in pages 23-34 of Ivie's opening brief, admitting the 
report as an exhibit was prejudicial error that warrants a new trial. 
D. The circumstances of this case show the DUI Report was 
used as recorded recollection. Its admission as an exhibit 
was error under Rule 803(5). 
The state claims it is not clear the DUI Report was used as a recorded 
recollection. Clear use of the report as recorded recollection arose from the 
desire of the state's trial counsel to get Marx's "exact" version of his interview 
with Ivie and the passage of time between the interview on March 23, 1996, and 
the trial on January 28 and 29, 1997 (R. 436, Exhibit 9 and R. 455). After 
establishing the report reflected knowledge when it was fresh in Marx's mind (R. 
416-415), the state's counsel asked Marx to "refer to your report to get this exact" 
and to provide Ivie's response "word for word" (R.414). A comparison of the 
report (Exhibit 9) and Marx's testimony (R. 414-412) shows that Marx and the 
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state's counsel meticulously worked word-for-word through the entire interview 
sequence of eighteen questions and three sections on actual time, date and day of 
the week. In terms of Rule 803(5), the report did in fact "enable the witness 
[Marx ] to testify fully and accurately" by "read[ing] into evidence." 
If Marx could have exactly recited the interview without referring to the 
DUI Report, the exhibit would be excluded under the principle stated in State v. 
Sibert that: "It is well settled that when a witness can and does testify to facts 
without resort to his memorandum, it cannot be used to bolster his testimony." 6 
Utah 2d 198, at 204, 310 P.2d 388, at 392 (citation omitted). 
Rule 803(5)'s prohibition against the admission of recorded recollection as 
an exhibit is not rendered irrelevant by the doctrine of multiple admissibility as 
argued in pages 27-28 of the state's brief. In 1 Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at 
Common Law, Sec. 13, p. 693 (Tillers Rev. 1983), the rule is captioned as: "§13. 
Multiple admissibility; evidence applicable to more than one purpose." Page 
694 of the treatise states: 
[W]hen an evidentiary fact is offered for one purpose and 
becomes admissible by satisfying all the rules applicable to it in 
that capacity, it is not inadmissible because it does not satisfy the 
rules applicable to it in some other capacity.... 
The terms purpose and capacity indicate the rule applies when an 
evidentiary fact fits a justifying reason for admissibility under one rule, although it 
would otherwise be excluded as not satisfying some other rule's rational. The 
relationship between Rule 803(5) and the rehabilitation rule argued by the state 
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does not fit this mold. Ivie submits that Rule 803(5) relates to the method by 
which a certain^brm of evidence (recorded recollection) may be admitted (by 
reading into the record). Since no underlying purpose for admission is noted in 
Rule 803(5), some other rule (such as impeachment rehabilitation) must provide 
the justification for admission of the statement. If the other rule being considered 
as an mode of admission specifically provided for receiving written statements 
(e.g. recorded conveyances), multiple admissibility might then properly apply. 
The state cites State v. Neal, 123 Utah 93, 254 P.2d 1053 (1953), as 
recognizing the multiple admissibility doctrine. Neal also states limitations: 
Evidence of any fact which rationally tends to prove any material 
issue is admissible unless forbidden by some specific rule, and 
should be received if offered for an admissible purpose although it 
would be inadmissible if offered for some other purpose. 
254 P.2d at 1056 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). Receiving the DUI 
Report as an exhibit failed these requirements in two regards. First, as a duplicate 
of already given testimony, it did not rationally tend to prove anything material 
with respect to credibility. Second, having been read word-for-word to provide 
Marx's exact version of the interview, the report's admissibility as an exhibit was 
specifically forbidden by Rule 803(5). 
See U.S. v. Ray, 768 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1985) holding under the federal Rule 
803(5) an arraignment proceedings transcript was properly admitted via testimony 
at the defendant's trial for failing to appear, but it was reversible error for the jury 
to receive the transcript as an exhibit. 
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CONCLUSION 
Ivie's trial objections furnish ample basis to reach the pre-motive 
requirement discussed in Point I of Ivie's opening brief. If this court finds 
inadequate objections were made on this point, the pre-motive issue should be 
ruled on pursuant to the doctrine of plain error. 
Regardless of the court's disposition specifically in terms of the pre-motive 
requirement, the DUI Report was not relevant as a prior consistent statement under 
either Rule 801(d)(1)(B) or common law. Even if the report could be considered 
proper rehabilitation evidence, its entire contents were covered in oral testimony. 
Receiving the report as an exhibit was not necessary; constituted a violation of 
Rule 803(5); and was an abuse of discretion under Rule 403. 
The error was harmful in that it improperly bolstered the state's witnesses, 
provided a powerful tool in the state's closing argument and gave the jury a 
concise one-sided statement of the state's key points during deliberations. There 
is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result for Ivie absent the error in 
receiving the report as an exhibit. Ivie respectfully requests the granting of a 
new trial. 
Dated this 2 c . day o f ^ . - A , ^ ^ , 1998. 
BRENT A. GOLD #1213 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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